

Power and Influence in Addressing **Technology-Facilitated Gender-Based Violence in Nigeria**





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About BBYDI

Brain Builders Youth Development Initiative (BBYDI) is a nonpartisan and not-for-profit civic organisation dedicated to fostering socio-political change and community development in Nigeria. Our primary focus is on equipping and empowering young people and local communities to drive sustainable development from the grassroots level.

Committed to promoting good governance, youth entrepreneurship, civic engagement, media literacy, techforgood and advancing civic liberties, we champion the United Nations' Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) within Nigerian communities. As a gender-inclusive youth advocacy group, BBYDI provides a platform for women to contribute to various socio-political spheres through social engagements, girl-child education, women's rights campaigns, and technology advocacy.

Over the past decade, we have earned a reputation as a leading civic engagement organisation, advocating for inclusive policies prioritising women and youth. Our work includes advocacy campaigns, social interventions, and collaborative projects with other civil society organisations. We rely on data-driven and evidence-based analyses to monitor government performance, demand transparency, and hold public officials accountable.

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Foreward



In our increasingly digital world, the transformative power of technology brings with it not only opportunity but also unprecedented challenges especially for those most vulnerable to harm. Among the gravest of these challenges is Technology-Facilitated Gender-Based Violence (TFGBV), a rapidly evolving threat that transcends borders and societal structures. In Nigeria, where digital penetration has grown exponentially, the urgency to confront TFGBV is particularly pronounced.

This report, *Power and Influence in Addressing Technology-Facilitated Gender-Based Violence in Nigeria*, offers a rigorous and timely exploration of the institutional, political, and social dynamics shaping responses to TFGBV. It combines power analysis, stakeholder mapping, and contextual risk assessment to identify key actors governmental, legislative, corporate, civil society, and international who can influence the safety of digital spaces for women and marginalized groups.

What sets this work apart is its clarity in identifying both opportunity and constraint. It acknowledges the fragmentation of institutional mandates, the variability in

political will, and the complex interplay between enforcement capacity and grassroots advocacy. Yet it also highlights emerging momentum driven by data protection reforms, civil society innovation, and growing international collaboration—that can be harnessed to turn the tide against digital harm.

This analysis is more than a mapping exercise; it is a strategic guide for action. It offers practical recommendations for mobilizing influence, bridging power gaps, and creating inclusive digital governance structures. Whether you are a policymaker, advocate, researcher, or platform operator, this document invites you to consider your role in fostering a digital ecosystem that is safe, equitable, and accountable.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Nurah Jimoh-Sanni'.


Nurah Jimoh-Sanni

Executive Director,
Brain Builders Youth Development Initiative



1

Introduction




1.1 Background Context





More access, less protection. Nigeria's internet boom has outpaced its digital safety measures.

In recent years, the rapid expansion of internet connectivity and mobile technology in Nigeria has transformed how people communicate, access information, and participate in public life. However, this digital growth has also exposed new and increasingly complex forms of gender-based violence. The Nigerian context presents unique challenges in addressing TFGBV. While digital access has expanded to over 156 million internet users, regulatory and enforcement mechanisms have not kept pace with the emerging risks. A patchwork of institutions including law enforcement agencies, data protection regulators, and telecom operators operate with overlapping but often poorly coordinated mandates. Moreover, many victims of TFGBV lack trust in law enforcement, face cultural stigmatization, or are unaware of reporting mechanisms. This combination of weak

institutional coordination and limited public awareness creates a power vacuum in which perpetrators often act with impunity. Efforts to confront TFGBV in Nigeria are further complicated by uneven power dynamics across key stakeholders. While some regulatory bodies and international partners demonstrate high interest in addressing digital safety, others especially within the political and private sectors may deprioritize the issue due to competing agendas or commercial considerations. Civil society organizations and academic institutions play a crucial role in advocacy, research, and public education, yet their influence is often constrained by limited funding and systemic barriers to policy engagement. As such, an in-depth understanding of these actors' relative power and interest is essential to creating sustainable strategies for change.



156
million+
internet users



1.2 Scope and Purpose

This analysis focuses on identifying key powerholders across governmental, legislative, regulatory, and private sectors who can influence digital safety outcomes in

Nigeria. The goal is to map actors, assess their power and interest in addressing TFGBV, and recommend targeted engagement strategies.

1.3 Methodology

This report utilizes the Stakeholder Power-Interest Matrix model, attributed to Eden and Ackermann (1998), to analyse stakeholders addressing Technology-Facilitated Gender-Based Violence (TFGBV) in Nigeria. This framework categorizes stakeholders into four quadrants: Key Players (high power, high interest), Subjects (low power, high interest), Context Setters (high power, low interest), and Bystanders (low power, low interest) based on their influence and commitment to the issue. The model guides strategic engagement by prioritizing stakeholders according to their ability to shape outcomes and their interest in TFGBV. The methodology integrates stakeholder mapping, political economy analysis, and power-interest grids. Qualitative data from policy documents, organizational reports, and legislative acts were used to identify key actors across five categories: government and regulatory bodies, political and legislative actors, private sector and tech platforms, civil society and research institutions, and international development partners. These actors were evaluated based on formal authority, enforcement capacity, resource control, policy advocacy history, technological capabilities, and access to target populations. Each was assigned power and interest scores from 1 (very low) to 5 (high), incorporating a gender and digital inclusion lens to address socio-cultural and systemic barriers (see Table 1 and 2 below). Power-interest grids classified actors as key players (e.g., Nigeria Data Protection Commission, NITDA), subjects (e.g., civil

society organizations), context setters (e.g., some political actors), or bystanders, informing a targeted engagement plan. This plan emphasizes accountability for high-power actors and support-building for high-interest, lower-power stakeholders, ensuring context-sensitive and impact-driven interventions.

The scoring methodology was also designed to ensure objectivity and comparability across diverse actors, allowing nuanced differentiation between rhetorical commitment and operational capacity. Each stakeholder was independently scored on both power and interest using a structured rubric (Tables 1 and 2), with triangulation from publicly available documents, activity reports, media coverage, and stakeholder interviews where applicable. This dual-axis scoring enabled a clearer visualization of institutional positioning within the TFGBV response landscape, revealing not just who holds influence, but who is mobilizing that influence in practice. The resulting power-interest matrix serves as both an analytical tool and a strategic guide for advocacy planning, partnership prioritization, and accountability tracking. For example, while some ministries possessed high regulatory power, their low interest scores indicated a need for sustained engagement to elevate TFGBV on their agenda, whereas CSOs, despite lower power ratings, demonstrated high interest and programmatic dedication positioning them as critical actors for grassroots mobilization and coalition-building.

TABLE 1: Power Scale

Score	Qualitative Description	Indicators	Detailed Scoring Criteria
1 – Very Low	Minimal ability to influence policy, decision-making, or resources	No formal authority, very limited resources or voice, not included in key discussions	• Legal/Formal Authority: No legal or regulatory mandate (e.g., informal community groups). • Influence Reach: Impacts < 100 individuals; no policy engagement. • Evidence: No documented role in TFGBV-related decisions or actions.
2 – Low	Limited or occasional influence	Some engagement capacity (e.g., small CSOs or local actors), but rarely shape outcomes	• Legal/Formal Authority: Limited mandate with no enforcement power (e.g., advisory roles). • Influence Reach: Impacts local communities (100–1,000 people); occasional consultation. • Evidence: Sporadic reports or advocacy with minimal policy impact.
3 – Medium	Moderate influence; can contribute but not drive change alone	Participates in consultations, can influence niche policies or practices	• Legal/Formal Authority: Partial mandate with advisory or secondary enforcement role. • Influence Reach: Impacts regional level (1,000–10,000 people); regular consultation. • Evidence: Contributions to policy drafts or campaigns with moderate visibility on related activities.
4 – Medium-High	Significant influence; shapes policy or controls key tools	Has regulatory or operational authority, visible role in shaping agendas	• Legal/Formal Authority: Clear mandate with enforcement or regulatory power. • Influence Reach: Impacts national level (10,000–100,000 people); shapes specific policies on related activities • Evidence: Leads initiatives or enforces regulations with documented outcomes on related activities
5 – High	Direct and consistent ability to make or enforce decisions	Controls laws, funds, platforms, or enforcement; key actor in digital governance	• Legal/Formal Authority: Full mandate with law-making or primary enforcement power. • Resources: Significant infrastructure on related activities • Influence Reach: Impacts millions (national/global); sets policy agendas. • Evidence: Consistently drives TFGBV policy, enforcement, or platform changes.

Source: Author



TABLE 2: Interest Scale

Score	Qualitative Description	Indicators	Detailed Scoring Criteria
1 – Very Low	No active interest or engagement; indifferent to the issue	No statements, actions, or relevant programs on TFGBV	- Public Commitment: No mention of TFGBV or digital safety in public statements or plans. - Programmatic Focus: 0% of activities related to TFGBV. - Engagement: Publication; No participation in TFGBV forums or partnerships. - Evidence: No media, reports, or actions addressing TFGBV.
2 – Low	Occasional or reactive interest	May mention TFGBV but does not prioritize it; minimal or ad-hoc involvement	- Public Commitment: Rare or vague mentions of TFGBV (e.g., 1–2 statements annually). - Programmatic Focus: <5% of activities on TFGBV on related activities; reactive efforts. - Engagement: Attends TFGBV events sporadically (<1/year). - Evidence: Limited, event-driven actions with no sustained impact.
3 – Medium	Recognizes importance; limited active engagement	Some relevant initiatives, statements, or partnerships, but not a central focus	- Public Commitment: Regular mentions of TFGBV (3–5 statements annually). - Programmatic Focus: Activities on TFGBV; small-scale programs. - Engagement: Publication; Participates in 1–3 TFGBV events or partnerships annually. - Evidence: Runs pilot projects or campaigns with moderate reach.
4 – Medium-High	Actively engaged and supportive; not leading but consistent	Runs regular programs, allocates resources, participates in networks	- Public Commitment: Frequent TFGBV advocacy (6–10 statements annually). - Programmatic Focus: established programs. - Engagement: Publication; Active in 4–6 TFGBV events or networks annually. - Evidence: Leads multiple initiatives with documented community impact.
5 – High	Fully committed and proactive; strong strategic alignment	Leads initiatives, allocates significant resources, actively advocates and drives policy	- Public Commitment: Consistent, high-profile TFGBV advocacy (>10 statements annually). - Programmatic Focus: >30% of activities on TFGBV; flagship programs. - Engagement: Publication; Leads or co-leads >6 TFGBV events or networks annually. - Evidence: Shapes national TFGBV policy or platforms with measurable outcomes.

Source: Author

1.4 Understanding Key Concept



TFGBV encompasses a continuum of behaviours that use digital tools to control, harm, or silence gendered subjects, often reinforcing patriarchal structures in virtual spaces.

Technology-Facilitated Gender-Based Violence (TFGBV)

This refers to harmful acts of violence perpetrated against individuals, predominantly women and marginalized groups, through digital technologies and online platforms. These acts include cyberstalking, doxxing, non-consensual image sharing, online harassment, and hate speech, which replicate and amplify offline patterns of gendered power imbalances. According to Dunn (2021), TFGBV encompasses "a continuum of behaviours that use digital tools to control, harm, or silence gendered subjects, often reinforcing patriarchal structures in virtual spaces." This definition highlights the intentional use of technology to perpetuate harm, emphasizing its role in extending traditional gender-based violence into digital realms. This includes cyberstalking, doxxing, non-consensual image sharing, hate speech, and other online abuses that mirror and extend offline patterns of gendered power and inequality. Similarly, Henry and Powell (2018) define TFGBV as "gendered violence that is enabled or amplified by technology, including acts that exploit digital affordances to intimidate, coerce, or violate." These definitions underscore the intersection of technology, gender, and power, aligning with the document's focus on addressing TFGBV in Nigeria's digital landscape.

Power Analysis

This is a methodological approach used to map and assess the influence, authority, and interests of stakeholders in shaping specific outcomes, such as policy or social change (Section 1.3). In the context of the document, power analysis is employed to identify institutional actors who can influence digital safety outcomes related to TFGBV in Nigeria. Schiffer and Hauck (2010) define power analysis as "a tool to understand the distribution of power among actors, their interests, and the structural constraints that shape their behavior in a given system." This involves evaluating formal authority, resource control, and enforcement capacity to reveal leverage points for advocacy. Similarly, Gaventa (2006) describes power analysis as a process that "examines visible, hidden,

and invisible forms of power to uncover how decisions are made and who benefits or is marginalized." These definitions emphasize the systematic assessment of power dynamics, which the document applies through stakeholder mapping and power-interest matrices to prioritize engagement strategies.

Stakeholder Mapping

A strategic process used to identify and categorize individuals or institutions with a stake in a particular issue based on their influence, interest, and capacity to affect outcomes (Section 1.3). In the document, stakeholder mapping is applied to classify actors across government, private sector, civil society, and international partners in addressing TFGBV. Reed et al. (2009) define stakeholder mapping as "a collaborative method to identify key actors, their relationships, and their relative importance in achieving project goals." This involves assessing stakeholders' roles, power, and motivations to inform targeted engagement. Bryson (2004) further describes stakeholder mapping as "a technique to visualize and prioritize stakeholders according to their influence and interest, facilitating strategic decision-making." These definitions align with the document's use of stakeholder mapping to create power-interest grids, guiding the prioritization of actors like the Nigeria Data Protection Commission or civil society organizations in TFGBV interventions.

Power-Interest Matrix

This is a tool used to classify stakeholders based on their level of power (ability to influence outcomes) and interest (degree of concern or commitment) in a specific issue, guiding engagement strategies (Section 3.1). The document employs this matrix to categorize actors like government bodies, tech platforms, and civil society in addressing TFGBV, rating them on a scale from very low to high. Eden and Ackermann (1998) define the power-interest matrix as "a framework that plots stakeholders on a grid to assess their influence and stake in a project, enabling managers to prioritize




Digital inclusion is the ability of individuals and groups to access, use, and benefit from information and communication technologies in ways that enhance their social and economic opportunities.

actions." Stakeholders with high power and high interest are key players, while those with low power but high interest are subjects. Mendelow (1991) similarly describes it as "a strategic tool to determine how to manage stakeholders based on their capacity to affect outcomes and their level of engagement." These definitions support the document's approach to tailoring advocacy and accountability strategies, such as engaging high-power actors like the National Assembly or supporting high-interest actors like civil society.

Digital Inclusion

Refers to the equitable access to and meaningful participation in digital technologies, ensuring that all individuals, particularly marginalized groups, can safely

engage in online spaces (Section 1.1). The document highlights digital inclusion as a critical factor in addressing TFGBV, noting barriers like high data costs and limited infrastructure in Nigeria. Warschauer (2003) defines digital inclusion as "the ability of individuals and groups to access, use, and benefit from information and communication technologies in ways that enhance their social and economic opportunities." This includes access to devices, connectivity, and digital literacy. Similarly, ITU (2020) describes digital inclusion as "ensuring that digital technologies are accessible, affordable, and usable for all, with a focus on bridging gender and socio-economic divides." These definitions resonate with the document's emphasis on empowering women and vulnerable populations through digital literacy and affordable internet to reduce exposure to TFGBV



2

Power and Stakeholders in TF-GBV in Nigeria

This section examines the institutional actors with the authority and capacity to influence digital safety outcomes related to TFGBV in Nigeria.

This section examines the institutional actors with the authority and capacity to influence digital safety outcomes related to TFGBV in Nigeria. Through a systematic review of organizational mandates, political frameworks, legal provisions and recent activities, five key stakeholder groups are identified: Government and Regulatory Bodies, Political and Legislative Actors,

International Development Partners, Private Sector and Tech Platforms, and Civil Society and Research Institutions. Utilizing a framework grounded in political economy and stakeholder analysis principles, this section maps these actors based on their influence, interest, and capacity to address TFGBV, providing a foundation for targeted engagement strategies.



2.1 Government and Regulatory Bodies



The Nigeria Data Protection Commission (NDPC), established under the Nigeria Data Protection Act 2023, enforces data privacy regulations to prevent abuses like doxxing and unauthorized data sharing.

In Nigeria, several government and regulatory bodies play key roles in addressing TFGBV, each bringing unique mandates and challenges to the collective effort. The Nigeria Data Protection Commission (NDPC), established under the Nigeria Data Protection Act 2023, enforces data privacy regulations to prevent abuses like doxxing and unauthorized data sharing. While it holds regulatory authority, its effectiveness is often hampered by limited public awareness and enforcement capacity, especially when dealing with global tech platforms that may prioritize international standards.

The National Information Technology Development Agency (NITDA) develops policies, such as the 2022 Code of Practice for Interactive Computer Service Platforms, mandating content moderation and digital inclusion. However, its influence is constrained by resistance from global tech firms and the need for coordination with other agencies. The Nigerian Communications Commission (NCC)

regulates telecommunications and can mandate Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to block harmful content, but its direct authority over social media platforms is limited. The Nigeria Police Force's Cybercrime Unit and Gender Desk are tasked with enforcing laws against TFGBV, yet they face challenges such as limited technical capacity and underfunding. The National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) advocates for human rights and can investigate TFGBV as a violation, but it lacks direct enforcement power. The Federal Ministry of Women Affairs develops policies to promote gender equality and protect women from violence, relying on partnerships with other agencies for implementation. Lastly, the Federal Ministry of Justice, through the Cybercrime Advisory Council, coordinates national cybersecurity strategies and advises on cybercrime policy, including TFGBV-related issues, but its effectiveness depends on inter-agency collaboration and is limited by slow judicial processes.



TABLE 3: Government and Regulatory Bodies

Institution	Role and Authority	Influence on Digital Safety	Power Dynamics
Nigeria Data Protection Commission (NDPC)	Enforces data privacy laws under the Nigeria Data Protection Act 2023, overseeing compliance, issuing guidelines, and imposing penalties.	Regulates data privacy to prevent TFGBV (e.g., doxxing), mandating platforms to enhance user data security and address complaints.	Strong regulatory power but limited by low public awareness, enforcement capacity, and global tech platforms' prioritization of international standards.
National Information Technology Development Agency (NITDA)	Regulates IT sector under NITDA Act 2007, develops policies like the 2022 Code of Practice for content moderation and digital inclusion.	Enforces content moderation to curb TFGBV (e.g., harassment), promotes digital literacy, and collaborates with tech firms.	Significant policy-setting power but faces resistance from global tech firms and needs better coordination with NDPC and law enforcement.
Nigerian Communications Commission (NCC)	Regulates telecoms and ISPs under the 2003 Act, can mandate content blocking and data provision for TFGBV investigations.	Enables network-level interventions (e.g., blocking malicious sites) and supports TFGBV reporting mechanisms.	Strong control over ISPs but limited authority over social media platforms, requiring collaboration for content-related issues.
Nigeria Police Force (NPF) – Cybercrime Unit and Gender Desk	Enforces Cybercrimes Act 2015, investigates digital crimes, and addresses GBV, including TFGBV, via Cybercrime Unit and Gender Desk.	Investigates and prosecutes TFGBV, collaborates with platforms, supports survivors, and runs awareness campaigns.	Enforcement power limited by technical capacity, underfunding, low public trust, and Gender Desk's focus on physical GBV.
National Human Rights Commission (NHRC)	Promotes human rights under NHRC Act 1995, investigates GBV, and advocates for policy reforms.	Investigates TFGBV as a human rights issue, advocates for survivor-centered policies, and educates on digital rights.	Advocacy power but no direct enforcement; influence relies on collaboration and public pressure, constrained by resources.
Federal Ministry of Women Affairs	Develops policies for gender equality and GBV protection, coordinates with NGOs and partners.	Advocates for TFGBV policies, funds survivor programs, and integrates digital safety into gender policies.	Policy advocacy power but no digital enforcement; impact depends on partnerships and is limited by bureaucracy.
National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons (NAPTIP)	Enforces anti-trafficking laws, investigates online exploitation like sextortion linked to TFGBV.	Targets online trafficking and sextortion, supports survivors, and raises awareness on digital risks.	Enforcement power limited by focus on physical trafficking and resources; needs coordination with NPF and NDPC for digital crimes.
Federal Ministry of Justice (Cybercrime Advisory Council)	Oversees Cybercrimes Act 2015, coordinates cybersecurity strategies, and advises on TFGBV policy.	Shapes cybercrime policies, coordinates with NPF and NITDA, and supports prosecutions.	Policy coordination power but no operational enforcement; limited by slow judicial processes and resource gaps.

2.2 Political and Legislative Actors



The National Assembly, through its Committees on ICT, Women Affairs, and Judiciary, holds the authority to enact and amend legislation addressing TFGBV.

The political and legislative actors shape the digital safety landscape through legal provisions. The National Assembly, through its Committees on ICT, Women Affairs, and Judiciary, holds the authority to enact and amend legislation addressing TFGBV. These committees can propose laws that strengthen penalties for online harassment and ensure that digital safety regulations are inclusive and gender-sensitive. However, their effectiveness is often constrained by slow legislative processes, political interests, and limited technical expertise on TFGBV. Additionally, gender biases within the Assembly may hinder the prioritization of TFGBV issues.

At the state level, the 36 State Houses of Assembly have the power to pass laws

complementing federal efforts on gender-based violence and digital inclusion. They can allocate budgets for local programs addressing TFGBV and support partnerships with civil society organizations and tech companies to promote safe digital spaces. Nevertheless, their influence is fragmented due to varying state capacities, political priorities, and resource constraints. Political parties and their women's wings, such as the National Women Leaders Forum (NWLFF), can advocate for the inclusion of TFGBV in party manifestos and push for gender-sensitive policies. While they wield productive power through agenda-setting and advocacy, their influence is limited by male-dominated party structures and reliance on elected officials to act on TFGBV issues.

TABLE 4: Political and Legislative Actors

Institution	Role and Authority	Influence on Digital Safety	Power Dynamics
National Assembly (Committees on ICT, Women Affairs, Judiciary)	Legislative authority at the federal level; proposes and oversees laws, budgets, and policies.	Can pass/amend laws like the Cybercrimes Act to address TFGBV and ensure agency compliance.	Holds strong compulsory power; limited by slow processes, political interests, and gender bias. Effectiveness relies on leadership and CSO pressure.
State Assemblies	Legislates on state matters including safety, education, and community programs.	Can pass TFGBV-supportive laws, fund digital safety programs, and partner with CSOs.	Holds institutional power at state level; effectiveness varies by state capacity, priorities, and alignment with federal efforts.
Political Parties & Women's Wings	Shape political agendas and candidate priorities; Women's Wings advocate for gender inclusion.	Can integrate TFGBV into party platforms and influence public discourse.	Hold productive (agenda-setting) power; constrained by male-dominated structures and lack of formal authority.

2.3 Private Sector and Tech Platforms



Major global platforms like Meta, X (formerly Twitter), and Telegram manage user safety features and content moderation while operating under Nigeria's Code of Practice for Interactive Computer Service Platforms (2022).

The private sector and tech platforms in Nigeria play a central role in shaping digital safety. Major global platforms like Meta, X (formerly Twitter), and Telegram manage user safety features and content moderation while operating under Nigeria's Code of Practice for Interactive Computer Service Platforms (2022). These platforms have introduced AI-driven tools, reporting systems, and privacy settings to counter TFGBV. Despite recent policy changes aimed at improving safety such as Meta's user-driven moderation and Telegram's metadata-sharing policy their global scale and profit motives often hinder accountability and prioritization of user protection in Nigeria.

Telecommunications operators such as MTN, Glo, and Airtel provide the backbone of digital connectivity through mobile internet and SMS services. Regulated by the Nigerian Communications Commission (NCC), they possess the technical ability to block harmful content and support enforcement measures. Innovations like Airtel's AI spam detection

and initiatives for digital literacy position them as crucial players in preventing digital abuse. However, their compulsory power is tempered by regulatory constraints, infrastructure costs, and high data prices, which can restrict digital access for vulnerable populations, thereby indirectly increasing their exposure to TFGBV.

Tech startups and internet service providers (ISPs) like Okra, MainOne, and Starlink contribute to digital safety by expanding access and developing tailored tech solutions. Startups can create specialized tools to detect and prevent TFGBV, while ISPs provide broadband services, especially in underserved rural areas. Though they hold productive power through innovation, their limited reach compared to major telecoms and reliance on external funding curtail their influence. Nevertheless, their flexibility and potential for partnerships with regulators and civil society organizations allow them to develop adaptive, context-specific responses to digital gender-based violence.

TABLE 5: Private Sector and Tech Platforms

Institution	Role and Authority	Influence on Digital Safety	Power Dynamics
Meta, X (Twitter), Telegram	Control major social media and messaging platforms; subject to Nigeria's 2022 Code of Practice, enforced by NITDA.	Can deploy TFGBV-specific tools (e.g., AI moderation, reporting features); influence behavior via algorithms and design.	Hold structural power due to massive user base; limited local accountability; global policies may prioritize profit over safety.
Telecom Operators (MTN, Glo, Airtel)	Provide mobile internet services; regulated by NCC; manage infrastructure and consumer protections.	Can block harmful content, detect harassment (e.g., spam alert tools), and support investigations; enable access to safe platforms.	Wield compulsory power over internet access; constrained by regulation and high infrastructure costs; high data costs limit reach.
Tech Startups & ISPs (e.g., Okra, MainOne, Spectranet, Starlink)	Offer internet access, fintech, and infrastructure services; regulated by NCC and NITDA.	Enable TFGBV reporting, digital safety innovation (e.g., AI tools), and rural internet access via satellite and broadband.	Hold productive power through innovation; limited by small market share and funding challenges; influence grows with partnerships.

2.4 Civil Society and Research Institutions



Paradigm Initiative has been instrumental in promoting digital rights legislation, notably the Digital Rights and Freedom Bill.

Organizations such as Paradigm Initiative, TechHer, Women's Technology Empowerment Centre (W.TEC), Webfala Digital Skills for All Initiative, the development Research and Projects Centre (dRPC), and the Centre for Information Technology and Development (CITAD) are at the forefront of advocacy, digital literacy, and policy reform. Paradigm Initiative has been instrumental in promoting digital rights legislation, notably the Digital Rights and Freedom Bill, which seeks to protect internet users from infringements on their fundamental freedoms. TechHer focuses on bridging the technology divide among women, offering digital skills training to empower women and girls. W.TEC conducts programs like the SHE CREATES CAMP and W.TEC Academy to nurture female tech creators and leaders. Webfala Initiative aims to empower underprivileged groups with STEM education and digital literacy skills. dRPC engages in development research and advocacy, influencing policy through partnerships. CITAD promotes digital inclusion and peacebuilding, addressing TFGBV through various initiatives.

Academic institutions like the University of Lagos (UNILAG), Obafemi Awolowo University (OAU), Ahmadu Bello University (ABU), and the National Institute for Educational Planning and Administration (NIEPA) contribute significantly to research and

training on TFGBV. UNILAG's Centre for Human Rights and Gender Studies and OAU's Institute for Gender and Development Studies focus on gender-based violence, producing research that informs policy and advocacy. NIEPA collaborates with international partners to integrate digital safety into educational policies, enhancing awareness and prevention strategies. These institutions provide evidence-based insights that support the efforts of CSOs and policymakers in addressing TFGBV.

The media, encompassing television, radio, print, and online platforms, plays a crucial role in shaping public discourse on TFGBV. Outlets like Channels TV, Punch, and Premium Times report on TFGBV incidents, raising awareness and educating the public. Radio and TV programs reach rural audiences, while online media and podcasts engage youth on digital safety topics. Traditional and religious leaders, wielding cultural and moral authority, influence community norms and behaviours. Youth groups, including student unions and community-based organizations, leverage social media for activism, driving TFGBV awareness through campaigns and peer education. Their grassroots mobilization and digital savviness make them key allies in creating safer digital spaces.




TABLE 6: Civil Society and Research Institutions

Institution	Role and Authority	Influence on Digital Safety	Power Dynamics
Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) (e.g., Paradigm Initiative, TechHer, W.TEC, Webfala, dRPC, CITAD)	Advocate for digital rights, gender equity, and literacy; conduct training, research, and litigation.	Run TFGBV awareness campaigns, digital safety training, and advocacy; challenge surveillance and push for protective laws.	Productive power via advocacy; no formal authority. Influence depends on funding, partnerships, and government openness.
Academic Institutions (UNILAG, OAU, ABU, UI, NIEPA)	Conduct research, policy engagement, and training on gender, technology, and digital safety.	Produce evidence-based TFGBV studies, develop digital safety curricula, and support advocacy through research.	Productive but indirect power; limited by funding and bureaucracy. Regional presence enhances local relevance.
Media (TV, radio, print, online)	Shape public opinion and civic discourse; regulated by NBC.	Raise TFGBV awareness via journalism and programming; spotlight digital safety initiatives; pressure institutions to respond.	Agenda-setting power; constrained by censorship, commercial pressures, and limited rural reach due to data/infrastructure.
Traditional & Religious Leaders	Hold cultural and moral influence in communities through sermons, dialogue, and mediation.	Promote TFGBV awareness in community spaces; challenge harmful norms and support survivors.	Strong social influence, especially in rural areas; limited by patriarchy, digital illiteracy, and resistance to change.
Youth Groups (Student unions, NYSC, CBOs)	Mobilize through activism and digital campaigns; often supported by CSOs.	Lead peer education, social media campaigns (e.g., #NoToSocialMediaBill), and monitor hate speech.	Productive grassroots power; limited by lack of formal authority, funding, and risks of state repression.

2.5 International Development Partners

These organizations provide financial support, technical assistance, and policy advocacy. Agencies such as UN Women, UNFPA, and UNDP collaborate with Nigerian institutions to implement programs that promote digital literacy, enhance data protection, and support survivors of online abuse. For instance, UNFPA's initiatives like the Borno Youth Digital Summit aim to train young people, especially women, on navigating digital spaces safely and recognizing online threats. Similarly, UN Women advocates for gender-sensitive digital policies and supports the integration of TFGBV considerations into broader gender equality frameworks. These organizations

leverage their global reach and expertise to influence national policies and practices, ensuring that TFGBV is addressed comprehensively.

However, the influence of international development partners is often constrained by the need to align their programs with Nigeria's national priorities and the existing political and legislative landscape. While they can provide funding and technical support, the implementation of their initiatives depends on the cooperation of Nigerian government agencies and the active participation of local communities. Moreover, the success of these programs is contingent

upon the capacity of local institutions to absorb and effectively utilize the support provided. Challenges such as limited infrastructure, varying levels of digital literacy among the population, and socio-cultural barriers can impede the effectiveness of

interventions. Therefore, while international partners are instrumental in advancing the fight against TFGBV, their impact is maximized when there is strong alignment with national strategies and active engagement of local stakeholders.

TABLE 7: International Development Partners

Institution	Role and Authority	Influence on Digital Safety	Power Dynamics
UN Agencies (UNESCO, UNFPA, ILO, UNDP, UN Women)	Promote education, gender equality, labor standards, and digital inclusion under the UNSDCF (2023–2027).	Implement digital literacy and TFGBV awareness programs (e.g., UNFPA's digital summit); support global TFGBV frameworks.	Wield soft power through funding and advocacy; influence depends on coordination and local adaptation of global mandates.
World Bank	Provides financial support for infrastructure and development, including digital identity systems.	Funds ID4D to improve data privacy and reduce risks like doxxing; promotes digital safety via digital economy projects.	High compulsory power via financial leverage; effectiveness depends on alignment with national priorities and execution capacity.
USAID	Supports governance, education, and digital development; global policy addresses TFGBV (2024–2034).	Promotes safe digital ecosystems; potential for targeted TFGBV programming in Nigeria.	Influential donor with strong funding power; must navigate Nigerian political dynamics to scale impact.
IDRC	Funds research on gender, tech, and digital rights; supports local researchers.	Backs TFGBV research networks (e.g., Feminist Internet Research Network) to inform policy.	Shapes policy through evidence, not direct enforcement; depends on research translation and uptake.
IFAD	Focuses on agricultural development and rural poverty; supports ICT4D.	Can integrate digital safety in rural women's ICT training, indirectly addressing TFGBV.	Moderate influence via rural project funding; limited by narrow agricultural focus and delayed implementation.
Global Affairs Canada	Promotes gender equality, digital inclusion, and women's empowerment via funding and technical support.	Potential to fund TFGBV-specific initiatives; less documentation on active programs.	Funding-driven influence; depends on local alignment and prioritization of TFGBV.
AfDB	Funds infrastructure, digital economy, and gender-inclusive projects across Africa.	Can support TFGBV-sensitive digital infrastructure and policies in Nigeria.	Holds financial leverage regionally; impact hinges on alignment with Nigerian government and CSO advocacy.

3

Stakeholder Power vs. Interest Analysis for Addressing TFGBV in Nigeria



3.1 | Power vs. Interest Analysis

TABLE 8: Summary of Stakeholder Power vs. Interest Analysis for Addressing TFGBV in Nigeria

Stakeholder Group	Typical Power Level	Typical Interest Level	Main Stakeholder Category	Strategic Role	Justification
Government & Regulatory Bodies	High–Medium	Medium–High	Key Players & Subjects	Policy and enforcement leaders	Possess legislative and operational tools to regulate digital spaces and TFGBV policy.
Political & Legislative Actors	High–Medium	Medium–High	Key Players, Context Setters	Legal reform and budget allocation	Can prioritize TFGBV through laws and funding but often lack consistent engagement.
Private Sector & Tech Platforms	High–Low–Medium	Medium–High	Key Players, Subjects	Infrastructure control and platform safety	Hold digital power and control communication tools but vary in TFGBV responsiveness.
Civil Society & Research Orgs	Medium–Low–Medium	High	Subjects, Context Setters	Advocacy, education, grassroots mobilization	Have expertise and commitment, but lack enforcement power or large-scale resources.
Intl. Development Partners	High–Low–Medium	Medium–High	Key Players, Subjects	Funders and policy influencers	Influence domestic action via funding and agenda-setting, though local leverage varies.

Source: Author - Note: Each power and interest are assigned score (Very Low-1, Low-2, Medium-3, Medium-High-4, High- 5)

Government and regulatory bodies in Nigeria, such as the NDPC, NITDA, and the Nigeria Police Force, typically occupy the "Key Player" quadrant, combining medium to high levels of power with growing interest in digital safety. These actors are pivotal due to their statutory authority over cybersecurity, law enforcement, and digital regulation. However, the degree of prioritization of TFGBV varies across institutions, with some agencies demonstrating limited technical capacity or fragmented mandates. Therefore, their strategic role as policy enforcers and regulatory anchors must be strengthened through inter-agency coordination, capacity-building, and integrated awareness programs. Without aligning their power with consistent interest, these actors risk operating in fragmented or responding reactively to digital harms. Likewise, political

and legislative actors, including the National Assembly committees and state-level houses of assembly, also demonstrate high to medium power due to their law-making and budgetary functions. Their interest in TFGBV tends to be moderate and politically contingent shaped by electoral cycles, gender sensitivity of leadership, and civil society pressure. As such, they are best understood as both key players and context setters. Their strategic contribution lies in amending laws, allocating funds, and mainstreaming TFGBV into party manifestos. Engagement here must focus on sustained advocacy, policy briefs tied to legislative mandates, and multi-partisan caucusing to build political will. Ensuring that TFGBV is treated as a non-partisan issue of digital rights and public protection is key to mobilizing legislative action.




Government and regulatory bodies in Nigeria, such as the NDPC, NITDA, and the Nigeria Police Force, typically occupy the 'Key Player' quadrant, combining medium to high levels of power with growing interest in digital safety.

Private sector and technology platforms represent a structurally powerful but interest-fragmented group. Dominant platforms like Meta and X (formerly Twitter), as well as telecom operators like MTN and Airtel, wield significant control over digital infrastructure and content dissemination, making them indispensable actors in digital safety. However, their commercial motivations often mean TFGBV receives only moderate attention unless linked to regulatory compliance or public relations pressure. These stakeholders straddle the line between key players and reluctant subjects. Consequently, a dual strategy is needed: enforce compliance through tools like Nigeria's Code of Practice for Interactive Platforms, while simultaneously incentivizing innovation via partnerships, hackathons, and data-for-good collaborations that align commercial success with societal safety outcomes. In contrast, civil society organizations and research institutions exhibit consistently high interest in combating TFGBV but possess only medium to low power, placing them firmly in the "Subject" quadrant. Their productive power lies in advocacy, community mobilization, research, and public education. Organizations like TechHer, Paradigm Initiative, and university research centres bring deep contextual knowledge and community trust but often face funding

constraints, limited policy access, and government pushback. Their strategic value lies in amplifying survivor voices, generating evidence for policy, and co-designing interventions. Thus, support strategies must prioritize funding, coalition-building, and knowledge translation mechanisms that integrate their insights into policy and platform design processes.

Meanwhile, international development partners, such as UN Women, UNFPA, the World Bank, and USAID, span a spectrum from medium to high power and interest depending on their programmatic scope and funding commitments in Nigeria. While they may not wield direct enforcement authority, their financial and technical leverage positions them as key players or influential subjects. Their strategic role lies in aligning TFGBV priorities with broader development agendas, funding local CSOs, and facilitating cross-sector collaborations. To maximize their impact, they should be engaged early in project design and included in regular multi-stakeholder reviews. Ensuring their support is embedded in national policy frameworks also enhances sustainability and local ownership of anti-TFGBV interventions.

The following are detailed analyses by specific institutional actors in table 8.



3.2 Government and Regulatory Bodies



The analysis of government and regulatory bodies in Nigeria reveals a constellation of actors with high structural power and varying degrees of interest in TFGBV.

The analysis of government and regulatory bodies in Nigeria reveals a constellation of actors with high structural power and varying degrees of interest in TFGBV. Central to this landscape is the Nigeria Data Protection Commission (NDPC), rated as a high-power, high-interest stakeholder. As the statutory regulator under the Nigeria Data Protection Act (2023), NDPC wields authority to mandate data privacy measures that directly intersect with TFGBV concerns, such as unauthorized data sharing and doxing. Its regulatory mandates, coupled with public commitments to digital safety, firmly position it as a key player. Similarly, the National Information Technology Development Agency (NITDA) occupies the key player quadrant, sharing the same high-high designation as NDPC. NITDA's development of the 2022 Code of Practice for Interactive Platforms gives it a central role in platform regulation and digital rights policy. Its active engagement in TFGBV-related dialogues and mandate to promote digital inclusion reflect a strong alignment of interest. The agency's technical policy-setting power should be leveraged through strategic partnerships that focus on co-developing TFGBV-specific protocols, while ensuring that global tech platforms comply with national digital safety norms. NITDA's potential is maximized when aligned with complementary regulatory bodies like NDPC and NCC in a harmonized framework. Also, the Nigerian Communications Commission (NCC) also falls within the high-power bracket, but exhibits medium interest in TFGBV. As the national telecoms regulator, NCC controls

infrastructure levers such as ISPs and network-level content filtering. However, its primary orientation toward consumer protection and infrastructure expansion often overshadows targeted actions on digital gender violence. Thus, while it qualifies as a key player in terms of power, its moderate interest categorizes it as a less reliable ally.

The Nigeria Police Force (NPF), particularly its Cybercrime Unit and Gender Desk, possesses medium-high power and moderate interest, making it a uniquely positioned enforcement body. While legally mandated to investigate digital crimes, its effectiveness is often constrained by limited training, under-resourced digital forensics units, and low public trust. NPF plays a critical role in responding to TFGBV incidents but lacks the institutional consistency and survivor-centred orientation needed for long-term impact. Conversely, agencies such as the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), the Ministry of Women Affairs and NAPTIP possess high interest but medium power, classifying them as subjects within the Power-Interest Matrix. These institutions lack enforcement authority but are essential actors in advocacy, policy monitoring, and public education.

The Federal Ministry of Justice, through its Cybercrime Advisory Council, holds moderate power and interest and is best understood as a context setter. Although it oversees legal frameworks that impact TFGBV, its bureaucratic positioning and slow judicial processes limit its proactive engagement.



TABLE 9: Political and Legislative Actors Ranking

Stakeholder	Power	Interest	Stakeholder Category	Justifications
Nigeria Data Protection Commission (NDPC)	High	High	Key Player	Regulates data protection, increasingly active on digital rights and TFGBV-related issues.
NITDA	High	High	Key Player	Sets national IT policies; engaged in digital safety initiatives; strategic for TFGBV governance.
NCC	High	Medium	Key Player	Regulates telecoms and internet access; has power but less visible engagement on TFGBV.
Nigeria Police Force (Cybercrime, Gender)	Medium-High	Medium	Key Player	Holds enforcement power; limited but growing attention to online GBV and cyber issues. No TF-GBV in the police Act
NHRC	Medium	High	Subject	Strong human rights mandate and engagement in GBV, but lacks enforcement authority.
Ministry of Women Affairs	Medium	High	Subject	Advocates on GBV, runs programs, but limited influence in broader digital governance.
NAPTIP	Medium	Medium - High	Subject	Enforces anti-trafficking laws, addressing TFGBV-related crimes like sextortion and online grooming. Active in survivor support and awareness, but limited digital-specific mandate and enforcement power in broader TFGBV governance.
Ministry of Justice (Cybercrime Council)	Medium	Medium	Context Setter	Participates in legislative processes and cybercrime strategy, but not a lead actor on TFGBV.

Source: Author - Note: Each power and interest are assigned a score (Very Low-1, Low-2, Medium-3, Medium-High-4, High- 5)



3.3 Political and Legislative Actors

At the federal level, National Assembly Committees particularly those on ICT, Judiciary, and Women Affairs possess high power due to their legislative authority, but currently demonstrate medium interest in TFGBV-specific issues. This positions them as key players who can significantly shape digital safety frameworks but have yet to fully prioritize TFGBV in legislative debates. Their power lies in the ability to amend key laws such as the Cybercrimes Act or the Violence Against Persons Prohibition (VAPP) Act to explicitly cover online harms. At the sub-national level, State Houses of Assembly hold medium power and medium interest, functioning as context setters within their jurisdictions. While they lack influence over national ICT regulation, they have a vital role in local implementation of gender-based violence laws, budgetary allocations, and

oversight of state-level programs. Their fragmented response to TFGBV often reflects disparities in technical knowledge, political will, and access to data.

Political parties and their women's wings represent a distinct category of subjects with medium power and high interest, especially where women's leadership structures are active and engaged. While they do not directly legislate, their influence on party manifestos, political discourse, and candidate selection can create enabling environments for TFGBV policy adoption. Women's wings, in particular, have shown strong interest in integrating gender equality into political platforms, though they often operate within male-dominated structures that limit their strategic reach.

TABLE 10: Political and Legislative Actors Ranking

Stakeholder	Power	Interest	Stakeholder Category	Justifications
National Assembly Committees	High	Medium	Key Player	Have legislative authority and budget oversight; limited proactive engagement on TFGBV unless triggered.
State Assemblies	Medium	Medium	Context Setter	Influence subnational lawmaking, but their involvement in TFGBV varies widely by state and political will.
Political Parties & Women's Wings	Medium	High	Subjects	Can drive political will and promote safe participation of women, but lack institutionalized focus or mechanisms to act on TFGBV directly.

Source: Author - Note: Each power and interest are assigned a score (Very Low-1, Low-2, Medium-3, Medium-High-4, High- 5)

3.4 Private Sector and Tech Platforms

The dominant social media platforms operating in Nigeria such as Meta (Facebook, Instagram), X (formerly Twitter), and Telegram possess high power due to their control over digital infrastructure, content algorithms, and platform policies that shape online interactions. However, their interest in addressing TFGBV is generally moderate, often driven by external regulatory pressure or reputational concerns rather than a proactive commitment to user protection. As key players, these platforms can enable or hinder TFGBV prevention depending on how they design and enforce user safety tools. Similarly, Telecom operators such as MTN, Glo, and Airtel similarly hold high power due to their role as gatekeepers of mobile and internet connectivity. With medium to high interest, these operators have the capacity to support TFGBV interventions through network-level tools like spam filtering, content blocking, and user education. Their participation in digital literacy campaigns and collaboration with enforcement agencies to trace abusive accounts highlights a growing willingness to engage. As key players, they

should be further mobilized through public-private partnerships, regulatory incentives for affordable safe access, and integration into national TFGBV reporting systems. Their role is particularly crucial in enabling safe access to online platforms, especially for women and marginalized users in rural and underserved areas.

At the mid- to lower end of the influence spectrum are tech startups and internet service providers (ISPs). Startups such as Okra and MainOne bring high interest and innovative potential, but their medium power positions them as subjects in this landscape. They can contribute by developing TFGBV-specific solutions such as AI-driven abuse detection, privacy-preserving fintech platforms, and secure digital ID systems. Meanwhile, ISPs like Spectranet, Starlink, and FiberOne are context setters, with low to medium power but growing interest. Their limited reach and market share constrain their policy influence, but their role in expanding safe internet access is valuable particularly in rural areas.

TABLE 1.1: Private Sector and Tech Platforms

Stakeholder	Power	Interest	Stakeholder Category	Justifications
Meta (Facebook, Instagram), X (Twitter), Telegram	High	Medium	Key Players	They control major social platforms where TFGBV occurs. While they have global policies, local responsiveness in Nigeria is limited and inconsistent.
Telecom Operators (MTN, Glo, Airtel)	High	Medium - High	Key Players	Provide the infrastructure for access; some are involved in digital literacy and safety partnerships, but their TFGBV response is largely indirect.
Tech Startups (Okra, MainOne)	Medium	High	Subjects	Innovators in digital services with growing reach; many are proactive on gender inclusion but have limited institutional power to affect broad policy.
ISPs (Spectranet, Starlink, FiberOne)	Low - Medium	Medium	Context Setters	Enable digital access, which shapes exposure to TFGBV. However, they lack a visible role or agenda on online safety issues.

Source: Author - Note: Each power and interest are assigned a score (Very Low-1, Low-2, Medium-3, Medium-High-4, High- 5)

3.5 Civil Society and Research Institutions

These actors demonstrate high interest and medium power, making them strong subjects in the power-interest matrix. Their influence stems from their productive power mobilizing communities, conducting awareness campaigns, providing digital literacy training, and engaging in legal advocacy and strategic litigation. Despite limited enforcement capacity or formal authority, their close ties to affected communities and commitment to digital rights make them indispensable. To maximize their impact, these organizations should be supported through sustained funding, inclusion in policy development processes, and strategic partnerships with government agencies and tech companies to bridge the gap between grassroots realities and formal policymaking. Similarly, academic institutions exhibit medium power and high interest, placing them in the same subject category as CSOs. These universities and research centres contribute by producing gender-sensitive digital safety research, evaluating policy impacts, and designing educational curricula that integrate TFGBV awareness. Their strength lies in knowledge generation, capacity building, and the ability to support evidence-based advocacy. While their influence on direct enforcement or

policy implementation may be limited, they are crucial to strengthening the evidence base that informs TFGBV interventions.

Other important social actors such as media outlets, traditional and religious leaders, and youth groups play more varied roles. The media, with medium power and medium interest, are classified as context setters, as they shape public discourse and awareness through journalism, storytelling, and campaigns. While they may not drive policy, they influence social norms and public accountability. Traditional and religious leaders also act as context setters with cultural authority, particularly in rural and conservative communities. However, their influence is often constrained by patriarchal norms and limited digital literacy. Youth groups, including student unions and organizations like Enough is Enough (EiE), show low to medium power but high interest, making them highly motivated subjects in the digital activism landscape. Their digital savviness, grassroots reach, and advocacy energy should be harnessed through digital tools, youth-centred TFGBV campaigns, and inclusion in broader civil society coalitions.

TABLE 12: Civil Society and Research Institutions

Stakeholder	Power	Interest	Stakeholder Category	Justifications
CSOs (TechHer, W.TEC, Paradigm, etc.)	Medium	High	Subjects	Actively engaged in advocacy, education, and research on TFGBV; limited enforcement power but strong agenda-setting influence.
Academic Institutions (UNILAG, OAU, etc.)	Medium	High	Subjects	Conduct research, generate evidence, and shape discourse on digital harms; limited direct influence on policymaking.
Media (TV, Online, Podcasts)	Medium	Medium	Context Setters	Influence public narratives and raise awareness of TFGBV; often reactive rather than strategic.
Traditional & Religious Leaders	Medium	Medium	Context Setters	Influence social norms and community responses; often gatekeepers to behavioural change but rarely engage directly on TFGBV.
Youth Groups (Unions, NYSC, EiE)	Low - Medium	High	Subjects	High vulnerability and activism on digital rights; have mobilization capacity but limited structural power.

Source: Author - Note: Each power and interest are assigned a score (Very Low-1, Low-2, Medium-3, Medium-High-4, High- 5)

3.6 International Development Partners

UN agencies, including UNFPA, UN Women, and UNDP, alongside organizations like USAID, Global Affairs Canada, and IDRC, fall into the subject category with medium power and high interest. These actors are deeply committed to promoting gender equality, digital inclusion, and safeguarding rights in digital spaces. Their strength lies in their technical expertise, global convening power, and ability to fund pilot programs and civil society-led initiatives. However, their influence on national enforcement mechanisms is indirect and often mediated through government partnerships. To optimize their impact on TFGBV prevention in Nigeria, these institutions should be strategically engaged during policy formulation stages, included in multi-sectoral coordination frameworks, and supported in aligning their funding cycles with national digital safety strategies. In contrast, large international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the African Development Bank (AfDB) are classified as key players, with high power due to their financial leverage, but only moderate interest in TFGBV-specific issues. Their involvement in Nigeria's digital transformation such as the World Bank's Digital ID projects or AfDB's investment in digital infrastructure provides

significant entry points to embed TFGBV safeguards. These actors can shape national policy and sectoral investment priorities through conditionalities, gender inclusion clauses, and technical assistance. However, unless TFGBV is integrated into broader digital economy and governance portfolios, their influence will remain structural rather than targeted. Strategic advocacy is therefore needed to elevate TFGBV as a core risk within digital infrastructure planning and social protection frameworks funded by these banks.

Moreso, institutions like the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) exhibit low to medium power and medium interest, functioning primarily as context setters. Though not primarily focused on digital safety, IFAD's engagement with rural women and ICT4D (Information and Communication Technology for Development) offers a useful channel for integrating TFGBV awareness and protection measures into community-based digital literacy and empowerment programs. While their reach may be sector-specific, their role is important in expanding TFGBV prevention efforts beyond urban centres.

TABLE 13: International Development Partners

Stakeholder	Power	Interest	Stakeholder Category	Justifications
UN Agencies (UNFPA, UN Women, etc.)	Medium	High	Subjects	Actively support TFGBV programming and capacity-building; influence national agendas through partnerships but don't control implementation.
World Bank	High	Medium	Key Player	Provides significant funding and technical assistance; TFGBV is not a primary focus but can be mainstreamed through gender and digital programs.
USAID, Global Affairs Canada, IDRC	Medium	High	Subjects	Strong commitment to gender and digital rights; fund local TFGBV initiatives, though influence is largely indirect through grantees.
AfDB	High	Medium	Key Player	Has funding and policy leverage in ICT and gender, though direct engagement with TFGBV is limited.
IFAD	Low - Medium	Medium	Context Setter	Works mostly in rural development; gender lens exists but limited focus or power in digital and TFGBV-specific interventions.

Source: Author - Note: Each power and interest are assigned a score (Very Low-1, Low-2, Medium-3, Medium-High-4, High- 5)

4

Risk Analysis and Mitigation

Understanding the risks associated with addressing TFGBV is essential to ensuring successful interventions, stakeholder engagement, and the safety of all involved.

Understanding the risks associated with addressing TFGBV is essential to ensuring successful interventions, stakeholder engagement, and the safety of all involved. This section identifies key risks across

institutional, socio-political, technical, and implementation domains and outlines strategies to mitigate these challenges effectively.



4.1 Risk Categories and Analysis



Institutional resistance, marked as a high-risk issue with high likelihood, creates significant barriers to addressing TFGBV.

Institutional resistance, marked as a high-risk issue with high likelihood, creates significant barriers to addressing TFGBV. Bureaucratic silos and overlapping mandates foster inter-agency rivalry, leading to fragmented policies and delayed responses. Agencies often prioritize individual agendas over collaborative efforts, resulting in disjointed strategies that fail to address TFGBV comprehensively. This resistance, driven by entrenched institutional cultures and unclear responsibilities, undermines the ability to create cohesive frameworks, leaving gaps in accountability and coordination that allow TFGBV to persist unchecked. The resulting policy incoherence amplifies vulnerabilities for at-risk groups, as systemic inefficiencies prevent timely interventions.

This institutional fragmentation directly feeds into the challenges posed by political apathy or backlash, a high-risk factor with medium likelihood. Politicians may deprioritize TFGBV due to gender biases, conservative voter pressures, or election-driven sensitivities, leading to underfunded initiatives and weak legislative support. In contexts where gender issues are politically contentious, this apathy stalls progress, leaving victims without adequate protection or recourse. The medium likelihood reflects varying political climates progressive governments may act, while conservative ones hesitate yet the risk remains that TFGBV is sidelined, exacerbating harm and eroding trust in governance structures meant to protect vulnerable populations.

Compounding these systemic issues, technical limitations and private sector non-compliance further hinder TFGBV responses. Technical limitations, a medium-risk issue with high likelihood, stem from law enforcement's lack of forensic tools, data analytics, or digital infrastructure, crippling their ability to investigate or mitigate TFGBV effectively. Similarly, private sector non-compliance, rated high risk with

medium likelihood, arises from tech platforms and telecoms prioritizing commercial interests over safety regulations. Weak enforcement mechanisms allow these entities to evade accountability, perpetuating unsafe digital environments. These gaps in capacity and compliance create a cycle where inadequate tools and unregulated platforms enable TFGBV to flourish, leaving victims exposed.

The risks escalate further with data privacy and survivor safety concerns, a very high-risk issue with medium likelihood, where poor handling of sensitive data can lead to leaks or retaliation against victims. In environments with weak cybersecurity, this mismanagement heightens survivors' vulnerability, deterring reporting and perpetuating cycles of abuse. Similarly, cultural and religious opposition, a high-risk factor with medium likelihood, sees patriarchal norms and conservative ideologies framing TFGBV prevention as a threat to tradition. This resistance, often led by community gatekeepers, stifles discourse on digital rights and gender equality, entrenching societal attitudes that normalize or dismiss TFGBV, thus amplifying harm to marginalized groups.

Low digital literacy and funding gaps deepen these challenges, with high risk and high likelihood. Limited awareness among rural, youth, and marginalized populations about online safety or reporting mechanisms increases their exposure to TFGBV, as they struggle to identify or respond to threats. Concurrently, funding and sustainability gaps, driven by reliance on short-term donor support and lack of national budget backing, threaten program continuity. These issues create a feedback loop: low literacy limits reporting, while underfunded programs fail to scale outreach or sustain interventions, leaving TFGBV unchecked and perpetuating systemic inequities across digital and social landscapes.

TABLE 15: Risk Categories and Analysis

Risk Category	Description	Risk Level	Likelihood	Justification
Institutional Resistance	Agencies may deprioritize TFGBV or resist coordination due to bureaucratic silos or overlapping mandates.	High	High	Inter-agency rivalry and mandate confusion often stall policy coherence and joint responses.
Political Apathy or Backlash	TFGBV may be deprioritized due to political sensitivities, gender bias, or election cycles.	High	Medium	Politicians may avoid sensitive gender issues to preserve conservative support or avoid controversy.
Technical Limitations	Law enforcement and regulators may lack forensic capacity, data analytics, or infrastructure to act effectively.	Medium	High	Many institutions lack the tools, training, or digital infrastructure to investigate or respond.
Private Sector Non-Compliance	Tech platforms and telecoms may resist safety regulation due to commercial concerns or weak enforcement.	High	Medium	Commercial interests may conflict with regulation, and enforcement mechanisms are still weak.
Data Privacy and Survivor Safety Risks	Poor handling of survivor data can expose them to further harm or retaliation.	Very High	Medium	Without secure protocols, survivor identities may be leaked or misused, increasing vulnerability.
Low Digital Literacy & Public Awareness	Many at-risk groups lack knowledge of online safety or TFGBV reporting mechanisms.	High	High	Rural, youth, and marginalized populations often lack skills or awareness to identify/report TFGBV.
Funding and Sustainability Gaps	Programs risk collapse without long-term funding or policy continuity.	Medium	High	Many interventions rely on short-term donor funds and lack national budget support or legal mandates.
Cultural and Religious Opposition	Patriarchal norms and conservative views may undermine TFGBV prevention efforts.	High	Medium	Cultural gatekeepers may resist discourse on digital rights or gender, especially in conservative areas.

Source: Author - Note: Each power and interest are assigned a score (Very Low-1, Low-2, Medium-3, Medium-High-4, High- 5)

4.2 Risk mitigation strategies

Effectively mitigating the multifaceted risks associated with TFGBV in Nigeria requires a nuanced strategy that aligns each risk with stakeholders' varying levels of power and interest. High-power actors such as the NDPC, NITDA, NCC, and the National Assembly wield the structural capacity to drive regulatory reforms, enforce compliance, and coordinate multi-agency responses. However, their engagement often hinges on

political will and perceived relevance, which can be undermined by institutional resistance, political apathy, or competing mandates. Therefore, strategic advocacy should reframe TFGBV as a public safety and governance issue rather than solely a gender concern. Simultaneously, donor agencies and ministries like Finance and Justice must be engaged to integrate TFGBV into mainstream digital governance and budget lines to

ensure long-term sustainability.

Conversely, high-interest but lower-power actors particularly CSOs, youth groups, and academic institutions play critical roles in awareness creation, survivor support, and policy monitoring, yet often lack the authority or resources to scale their impact. Their efforts must be leveraged to influence public narratives and pressure more powerful actors into action. Technical limitations among security agencies, data privacy gaps, and low digital literacy require targeted

capacity building and co-implementation partnerships between these actors and international development partners. Cultural resistance and platform non-compliance further underscore the need for context-sensitive strategies involving traditional leaders and media influencers, as well as stronger regulatory oversight of private sector platforms. Overall, an effective mitigation strategy depends on aligning each actor's capabilities and motivations with specific risk responses in a coordinated and adaptive ecosystem.


TABLE 16: Risk Mitigation

Risk Category	Stakeholder Category (Power–Interest)	Strategic Mitigation Role	Tailored Strategy
Institutional Resistance	Key Players (High Power – Medium/High Interest): NDPC, NITDA, MoJ	Lead Coordination	Form multi-agency working groups; assign coordination roles via formal mandates.
Political Apathy or Backlash	Key Players & Context Setters (High/Medium Power – Medium Interest): National Assembly, State Assemblies	Political Buy-in	Engage committees, link TFGBV to national development/election integrity, build bipartisan support.
Technical Limitations	Key Players & Subjects (Medium–High Power): NPF Cyber Units, NHRC, FMoWA	Capacity Builders	Provide technical training, digital forensics tools, and donor-funded infrastructure upgrades.
Private Sector Non-Compliance	Key Players (High Power – Medium Interest): Meta, MTN, NCC	Regulatory Targets	Enforce safety standards via NCC, use naming/shaming and incentives for compliance.
Data Privacy & Survivor Safety Risks	Subjects & Context Setters (Medium Power – High Interest): CSOs, NHRC, Academia	Safeguard Champions	Co-develop data privacy protocols, provide survivor-centered services, train officials.
Low Digital Literacy & Public Awareness	Subjects (Low–Medium Power – High Interest): CSOs, Youth Groups, Media	Public Educators	Launch targeted campaigns, integrate into NYSC, use local media/influencers.
Funding and Sustainability Gaps	Key Players (High Power – Medium Interest): World Bank, AfDB, MoF	Funders & Enablers	Advocate for budget line items, co-financing models, embed TFGBV in sectoral policies.
Cultural & Religious Opposition	Context Setters (Medium Power – Medium Interest): Traditional & Religious Leaders	Norm Shapers	Use culturally resonant messaging, involve leaders in public declarations against TFGBV.

Source: Author

5

Conclusion and Recommendations



5.1 Conclusion



This report identifies institutional actors shaping digital safety in Nigeria, analyse their relative power and interest in addressing TFGBV, and propose targeted engagement and risk mitigation strategies.

This report identifies institutional actors shaping digital safety in Nigeria, analyse their relative power and interest in addressing TFGBV, and propose targeted engagement and risk mitigation strategies. Each of these goals has been comprehensively addressed through a structured, stakeholder-centred methodology. First, mapping of key actors revealed that government and regulatory bodies particularly the NDPC, NITDA, NCC, and the Nigeria Police Force hold substantial institutional and compulsory power but often operate in silos. Legislative bodies have law-making authority, but limited interest and technical understanding of TFGBV. Conversely, civil society, academic institutions, and international development partners show high interest but comparatively less power, highlighting a gap between political authority and commitment

to digital safety. Second, the power-interest analysis demonstrated that addressing TFGBV in Nigeria requires nuanced engagement. High-power, low-interest actors such as tech platforms and political parties must be held accountable through public-facing scorecards, regulatory enforcement, and incentives for innovation. High-interest, low-power actors such as CSOs and youth groups must be supported with funding and policy access to scale grassroots action. Third, the engagement strategy and risk analysis offered integrated solutions for bridging the coordination gap across institutions. The proposed stakeholder-specific actions ranging from inter-agency MOUs to digital literacy campaigns and private sector hackathons present a context-sensitive, multisectoral pathway for transformative change.

5.2 Recommendations

To effectively address TFGBV in Nigeria, the following recommendations are organized by stakeholder group to ensure targeted, actionable, and context-sensitive strategies.

Each focus on leveraging the respective actors' power and interest to drive systemic change.





Government and Regulatory Bodies

- The Federal Ministry of Justice should create a multi-stakeholder council to define institutional roles, enhance inter-agency collaboration, and ensure accountability in implementing TFGBV policies.
- NDPC and NITDA should jointly form a taskforce with quarterly assessments and shared digital safety dashboards to monitor progress and align efforts across agencies like NCC and the Nigeria Police Force.
- Enhance the technical capacity of the Nigeria Police Force's Cybercrime Unit and Gender Desk through training and digital forensics tools to improve investigation and response to TFGBV cases.



Political and Legislative Actors

- National Assembly Committees on ICT, Women Affairs, and Judiciary should draft and prioritize amendments to the Cybercrimes Act to explicitly address TFGBV, supported by civil society advocacy.
- Women's wings of political parties should lead efforts to integrate TFGBV prevention into party manifestos, using media and donor support to build bipartisan political will.
- State Houses of Assembly should allocate budgets for local TFGBV programs and align with federal policies to ensure consistent legislative action across jurisdictions.



Private Sector and Tech Platforms

- NITDA should fully operationalize the 2022 Code of Practice for Interactive Platforms, imposing measurable penalties for non-compliance by platforms like Meta and Telegram to ensure robust safety measures.
- Introduce annual TFGBV Compliance Awards and hackathons to encourage tech platforms and startups to develop AI-driven safety tools and privacy-preserving solutions, aligning commercial interests with user protection.
- Engage telecom operators like MTN, Glo, and Airtel in public-private partnerships to expand affordable internet access and integrate TFGBV reporting systems into their networks, particularly for rural users.



Civil Society and Research Institutions

- International donors like IDRC and UN Women should allocate dedicated grants for CSO-led research, capacity building, and advocacy to sustain grassroots TFGBV initiatives.
- NDPC in partnership with CSOs should convene regular TFGBV Knowledge-to-Policy Forums to translate community-based evidence from CSOs and universities into national regulations.
- Support CSOs like TechHer and Paradigm Initiative to lead survivor-centred campaigns, leveraging their community trust to influence policy and platform accountability.



International Development Partners

- Engage donors like the World Bank and AfDB early in project design to embed TFGBV safeguards into digital infrastructure and gender equity programs, ensuring alignment with Nigeria's priorities.
- UN agencies (e.g., UNFPA, UN Women) and USAID should fund training programs for CSOs and government agencies to enhance digital literacy and TFGBV response capabilities.
- Integrate international partners into multi-stakeholder reviews to foster coordination between local actors and global expertise, enhancing the sustainability of TFGBV interventions.

Appendix

TABLE 17: Engagement Plan for Key Stakeholder Groups on TFGBV in Nigeria

Stakeholder Group	Engagement Goal	Accountability / Ally-Building Approach	Key Engagement Activities	Frequency & Channels
Government & Regulatory Bodies	Ensure enforcement and policy action	Accountability: Set clear performance benchmarks; regular reporting on TFGBV enforcement progress. Ally-building: Co-develop joint taskforces and awareness campaigns.	Formal MOUs for inter-agency collaboration Quarterly progress reviews Joint workshops and capacity building	Quarterly meetings via formal channels; periodic field visits; official reports
Political & Legislative Actors	Drive legal reform and budget support	Accountability: Publicly track legislative proposals and budget commitments. Ally-building: Provide evidence-based policy briefs and success stories aligned with political agendas.	Policy roundtables and caucus briefings Public accountability forums Tailored advocacy materials	Biannual policy workshops; continuous advocacy via emails and briefings
Private Sector & Tech Platforms	Strengthen platform safety and innovation	Accountability: Establish compliance requirements and public reporting of safety measures. Ally-building: Offer incentives (recognition, partnerships) for innovation in TFGBV mitigation.	Partnership agreements on tech safeguards Innovation challenges and hackathons Compliance audits and feedback loops	Ongoing collaboration; annual innovation events; monthly check-ins with compliance leads
Civil Society & Research Organizations	Mobilize advocacy, research, and community action	Ally-building (main focus): Fund and integrate CSO research into policymaking; amplify grassroots voices. Accountability: Transparent use of funds and outputs in advocacy campaigns.	Grants and capacity-building workshops Joint advocacy campaigns and media engagement Data-sharing platforms	Quarterly capacity-building sessions; monthly coordination calls; event-based collaboration
International Development Partners	Align funding and technical support	Accountability: Regular donor reporting on project milestones. Ally-building: Engage donors early in project design and local capacity-building.	Donor alignment meetings Multi-sector project reviews Co-hosted knowledge exchanges	Biannual donor review meetings; ongoing communication through project management platforms

Source: Author

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